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Abstract
Background
Offering a modest financial incentive to people with psychosis can promote adherence to
depot antipsychotic medication, but the cost-effectiveness of this approach has not been
examined.
Methods
Economic evaluation within a pragmatic cluster-randomised controlled trial. 141 patients
under the care of 73 teams (clusters) were randomised to intervention or control; 138
patients with diagnoses of schizophrenia, schizo-affective disorder or bipolar disorder par-
ticipated. Intervention participants received £15 per depot injection over 12 months, addi-
tional to usual acute, mental and community primary health services. The control group
received usual health services. Main outcome measures: incremental cost per 20%
increase in adherence to depot antipsychotic medication; incremental cost of ‘good’ adher-
ence (defined as taking at least 95% of the prescribed number of depot medications over
the intervention period).
Findings
Economic and outcome data for baseline and 12-month follow-up were available for 117
participants. The adjusted difference in adherence between groups was 12.2% (73.4%
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control vs. 85.6% intervention); the adjusted costs difference was £598 (95% CI -£4 533, £5
730). The extra cost per patient to increase adherence to depot medications by 20% was
£982 (95% CI -£8 020, £14 000). The extra cost per patient of achieving 'good' adherence
was £2 950 (CI -£19 400, £27 800). Probability of cost-effectiveness exceeded 97.5% at
willingness-to-pay values of £14 000 for a 20% increase in adherence and £27 800 for good
adherence.
Interpretation
Offering a modest financial incentive to people with psychosis is cost-effective in promoting
adherence to depot antipsychotic medication. Direct healthcare costs (including costs of the
financial incentive) are unlikely to be increased by this intervention.
Trial Registration
ISRCTN.com 77769281
Introduction
Antipsychotic medication for people with psychosis can prevent relapse, reduce hospitalisation
and improve quality of life outcomes.[1] Injectable or depot antipsychotic medication may also
reduce relapse more effectively than oral medications.[2] Non-adherence to antipsychotic
medication by people with psychosis can have negative outcomes, such as relapse and suicide,
[3, 4] while adherence is associated with remission from symptoms.[5] Non-adherence is
highly prevalent in people with schizophrenia: [6] about 50% of patients are non-adherent to
oral medications and 25% to depot medications.[7]
Non-adherence to antipsychotic medications can lead to higher utilisation of community
services and increased health and social care costs.[8] Greater adherence to antipsychotics may
decrease the risk of hospital admissions [9] and may be associated with lower use of other
health care resources.[10] Nonetheless, the evidence-base on cost and cost-effectiveness conse-
quences of non-adherence remains slim; [10] likewise, it remains to be proved that improving
adherence to mental health medications reduces health service expenditure.[11]
Programmes to improve adherence include psycho-educational and behavioural interven-
tions that can be delivered to individuals or groups (of patients or family members) in clinical
or community settings.[12] Currently the evidence on the effectiveness of therapies to improve
adherence in people with schizophrenia is somewhat mixed [12, 13]. However, one strategy for
behavioural change that has shown promise in other areas of mental health and substance
abuse treatment is to offer a financial reward for adhering to medication.[14–17] New trial evi-
dence suggests that ‘money for medications’–offering a modest financial incentive—is effective
in improving adherence to maintenance treatment with depot antipsychotic medications.[18]
We investigated the costs and cost-effectiveness of the trial’s financial incentive intervention in
the context of community mental health services in England.
Methods
Design and methods
The trial design was a cluster-randomised controlled trial of a financial incentive scheme to
encourage adherence to maintenance (depot) anti-psychotic medications, with nested economic
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evaluation. The clinical paper [18] describes trial recruitment methods and the mental health
system context in further detail.
Assertive outreach and community mental health teams and their patients were invited to
participate in the study. NHS Mental Health Trusts in England, within which these mental
health teams operated, typically ran a number of community and secondary care services but
did not provide primary medical services (the latter being provided by general medical practi-
tioners)[19]. From the participating teams we recruited patients with poor rates of adherence
to long-acting (depot) anti-psychotic medication, of 75% or below over the course of a four-
month period prior to screening. In practical terms, patients with a 75% rate of adherence
would miss between three and 13 injections in a typical year, depending on the treatment cycle.
To be eligible for the trial, patients were to be aged 18 to 65 years, under the care of the team
for at least four months, be able to give informed written consent, and have a diagnosis of
schizophrenia, schizo-affective psychosis or bipolar affective disorder.
To balance numbers of participants between teams in more and less deprived areas, teams
were stratified by high or low Mental Illness Needs Index (MINI) score.[20, 21]
Intervention. Participants under the care of teams randomised to the intervention
received a financial incentive of £15 from the clinician administering the depot injection imme-
diately after the injection was given.[18] Clinicians and participants were for this reason not
blinded to allocation. The size of payment was intended to avoid creating financial dependency
(the maximum amount of income that could be gained from the incentive being £60 every 4
weeks); it was below the amount which could have negatively impacted on the patient’s entitle-
ment to welfare benefits.[16] Intervention participants received these payments in addition to
their standard treatment from their assertive outreach or community mental health team for a
period of 12 months.
Control. Control group participants received their usual health care services, including
services from their community mental health or assertive outreach teams.
Data collection. Over the period of the study, research assistants visited the treating asser-
tive outreach and community mental health teams to extract data on outcomes and resource
use from the electronic or paper-based case records held by the responsible NHS Mental
Health Trusts. The researchers searched the patient records at each data collection point in
order to complete a case record form developed for the study, using electronic patient records
where available, or paper records if not. This involved searching depot cards and clinical prog-
ress notes, and other relevant medical communications and reports on file; in some cases it was
necessary to check with clinicians in order to ascertain details of some information held in the
records. Roughly a third of extractions relied on a combination of electronic and paper records
(38%), while 25% of extractions were by electronic records only and 12% by paper records
only; for another 25% of extractions, researchers both consulted records and also involved cli-
nicians to obtain or check information. At baseline, researchers also collected data directly
from patients on subjective quality of life and asked patients for permission to be contacted to
complete a 12-month follow-up re-assessment. At 12-month follow-up, researchers collected
both quality of life data from consenting patients and also asked clinicians to complete a mea-
sure of clinical improvement (Clinical Global Impression Scale (CGI)[22]). Case record forms
were completed at baseline, at the end of the 12-month study period after randomisation and
(not reported here) at 18 and 36 months post-randomisation.
Costs. The analysis took an NHS costs perspective, covering services usually commis-
sioned or provided by the NHS. Information was collected on inpatient, outpatient and com-
munity mental health services, general hospital and primary care services, prescribed oral
medications and prescribed and received depot medications.
Cost Effectiveness: Financial Incentives and Depot Medications
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At baseline, while service use and oral medications prescriptions were recorded for the 12
months prior to the date of randomisation, antipsychotic depot medications given were
recorded over the 12 months prior to the date of screening for trial eligibility. In some cases
there was a considerable lag between randomisation and screening dates (36 participants
(25.5%) were allocated to groups more than 8 weeks after being screened) (see S1 file). There-
fore we adjusted the total pre-baseline depot counts and costs to bring them into line with
other costs (i.e., modelling treatment cycle and depot medication use over the same pre-rando-
misation period as other costs). At 12-month follow-up, researchers recorded all service and
medication use over the prior 12 months.
The case record form was piloted using case records of seven patients recruited early in the
trial. At that stage it was recognised that only basic information on names and dosage of oral
medications prescribed could be located in most of these records. The dates over which medi-
cations had been taken were therefore not recorded on subsequent case recording forms. We
have assumed for the purpose of the analyses that oral medications recorded were taken over
the full 12 months prior to baseline and follow-up points.
Oral and depot medication costs were calculated drawing on the Prescription Cost Analy-
ses.[23] Each study medication code was assigned to the corresponding British National For-
mulary chemical name. To each depot received we attached the cost of the dosage of injectable
medication (e.g. for 25 mg/ml in a 1ml ampule). In a small number of cases, no medication
code was given (in 3% (n = 23) of depots in the control sample at baseline, and in 3% (n = 45)
of intervention depots at follow-up). In these cases, the average cost of a depot per treatment
cycle per data point was assigned. Oral medications were similarly assigned unit costs based on
the dosage and medication unit (e.g. milligrams).
Unit costs of services were taken from nationally representative published sources [24, 25]
and other published sources (Table 1). The base year was 2010/11. Costs to the NHS at baseline
and 12-month follow-up were calculated by applying unit costs to resource use items collected.
The following professionals were assumed to form part of the client's involved team (commu-
nity mental health or assertive outreach): community mental health nurses, occupational thera-
pists, psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers and support workers.[26, 27] Few data on
duration of contact with community service personnel were available (about 12–20% of cases,
depending on the type of personnel, at baseline and follow-up) so it was not feasible to use per-
minute unit costs; instead, we drew on the cost of a contact in any setting (office/service and
home/community settings), taken from the NHS reference costs for England.[25]
Intervention costs. The intervention cost was calculated as the total number of incentive
payments given over the study period. The intervention was administered in a uniform man-
ner: an incentive payment of £15 in cash was provided on each occasion that the depot was
given. The number of incentive payments was therefore variable, depending on the number of
depot injections given. Researchers working with individual teams reported that there were no
additional resources used in producing the intervention. Teams would keep a stock of “petty
cash” so that there were no particular additional requirements in terms of securing the incen-
tive payment in the premises. Contacts with nurses, including those giving depot injections,
were recorded as part of the data extraction.
Outcomes. A continuous measure of adherence was calculated as the percentage of
prescribed injections received in the 12-month study period; also a binary measure of adher-
ence was calculated as whether the percentage of prescribed injections received exceeded
95% of the total prescribed, to represent the ratio of patients with "good adherence" in each
group.[18] The study was powered to detect a shift of 20% in mean adherence; operationaliz-
ing the trial’s primary outcome for the economic analysis, we have considered the incremen-
tal cost of achieving a 20% increase in adherence to prescribed depot injections taken over
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the prior 12 months. We also examined the incremental cost of achieving the taking of at
least 95% of the prescribed number of depot medications over the prior 12 month interven-
tion period.
Other outcomes examined in the economic analysis were: clinical improvement as assessed
on the CGI (clinician ratings ranging from 1 (very much improved) to 7 (very much worse))
and subjective quality of life (SQOL), as assessed using the SQOL component of the DIALOG
questionnaire. This measures self-reported quality of life in terms of eight satisfaction with life
domains (e.g. mental health, accommodation) with a scale score ranging from 1 (lowest satis-
faction) to 7 (highest satisfaction) [28, 29].
Cost effectiveness analyses. An intervention can be considered cost-effective if the inter-
vention is more effective and less costly than the alternative; or if the intervention is more effec-
tive and more costly than the alternative, and the purchaser is willing to pay the additional cost
to achieve the benefit of the intervention. In the latter case, the incremental cost-effectiveness
ratio (ICER), the incremental cost (ΔE) per unit of outcome gain that is associated with the
intervention (ΔC), must be less than the purchaser's willingness to pay (λ) for this gain.[30]
Table 1. Unit costs.
Resource item Unit Cost, range (£,
2010/11)
Unit of measurement
Hospital use
Mental Health Inpatient service use
MH outpatient attendances (A&E, day and outpatient
appointments)
97–185 per attendance [25]
Mental Health Inpatient bed days FT 327–633 per day [25]
Mental Health residential and hospital alternativesa 92–279 per day [24, 48–50]
General Hospital Inpatient service use
General hospital all outpatient attendances (A&E and
outpatients)
111–117 per attendance [25]
General Hospital inpatient bed days FT 424 per day [25]
Community and primary health services
Family support worker 46 Hour [24]
Vocational worker 53 Per contact [24]
Substance abuse worker 116 Per contact [25]
Counsellor 60 Per consult [24]
CMHT contactb 126 Per contact [25]
AOT contactb 121 Per contact [25]
GP home visit 82 Per visit [24]
GP surgery 25 Per visit [24]
Medicationsc Various Standard Quantity Units
[23]
CMHT = community mental health team, AOT = assertive outreach team.
a Includes: crisis team beds, clinical crisis house, non-clinical alternatives to inpatient admission; residential
rehabilitation for people misusing drugs and alcohol.
b Team staff assumed to include the following workers: Mental health nurse/CPN, Mental health support
worker, Occupational therapist, Psychiatrist, Psychologist, Social worker.
c Depot medications: cost of units of mg/ml ampules; oral medications: cost per units of mg, mcg or ml.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0138816.t001
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This decision rule can be written as:
DC
DE
< l
This relationship between willingness to pay and cost per unit of benefit can also be
expressed in terms of net monetary benefit (NMB):
NMB ¼ ðDEÞ  l ðDCÞ
If the purchaser's willingness to pay for a unit of outcome associated with the intervention is
less than the cost of achieving that outcome, the NMBmust be less than 0, and the intervention
should not be adopted.
Statistical analyses. The cost-effectiveness analysis examined net-benefit through multi-
level multivariate regressions adjusting for the following covariates: treatment allocation, base-
line measure of outcome (except in the case of the CGI, measured at follow-up only), total cost
in the pre-baseline year, high/ low MINI score category, and the average time (in weeks)
between prescribed depots (or mean depot treatment cycle) in the year prior to screening. The
latter was controlled for as some patients' depot cycles changed over the period. The modelling
allowed costs and outcomes to be correlated both within and between clusters, with random
effects for the participating team clusters. Descriptive analyses were carried out using Stata 12
[31]; multilevel modelling was carried out in R using the lme function (part of the nlme package
[32], following methods described in Ng [33] and Gomes et al.[34] for fitting a bivariate normal
response model. Error terms for costs and outcome equations were assumed to be normally
distributed. The coefficients on the allocation term in the costs and effects equations (giving
the cost and outcome differences, respectively, between groups) were used to derive NMB over
a range of willingness to pay (£0 to £30 000) for the additional benefit associated with the inter-
vention. The 95% confidence intervals for the ICER were calculated from the model estimates
using Fieller’s method.[35] Cost-effectiveness acceptability curves (CEACs) were constructed
from the regression results, depicting the probability of the ICER being less than each willing-
ness-to-pay value in the range. CEACs are useful in quantifying sampling uncertainty [35] and
providing a graphical representation of the uncertainty facing purchasers in deciding whether
to adopt an intervention.[30]
We analysed participants’ data in the groups to which they had been randomised. The anal-
yses retained cases where participants had depot data for at least 4 consecutive months in the
community (participants could be absent because of long-term hospital or prison stays). We
likewise calculated adherence for individuals with a minimum of 4 consecutive months’ data,
the same criterion used in the screening period. We were uncertain whether patients who were
out of the community for periods longer than one treatment cycle were receiving depots, and
so we excluded these periods from the adherence measure’s numerator and denominator. We
did not analyse data from participants who withdrew from participating in the trial and with-
drew consent for the research team to access their medical records.
Missing data. Data necessary to calculate both outcomes and costs were missing for some
cases. Any cases where insufficient data were available to calculate adherence were counted as
missing in the clinical effectiveness analyses.[18] As described above, costs of medications
received in the ‘gap’ between screening and trial entry dates were imputed and the number of
depots adjusted, based on the estimate of adherence proportion in the pre-baseline period: as a
result, the costs of cases lacking sufficient data to calculate baseline adherence were considered
to be missing. In addition, where information was missing for all items of hospital or of
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community service use, the case was considered as missing. Only complete cases were used in
the analysis.
Sensitivity analysis. Information was also extracted on times when participants 'did not
attend' (DNA) sessions with health professionals. However, DNAs could either reflect a session
that had been booked with the participant in a service setting but not attended, or an unsuc-
cessful planned or unplanned community visit. Given that no duration information was avail-
able for DNAs and that the contact might have taken little staff time, we excluded DNAs from
the main analysis. While DNAs possibly may entail substantial resource use, no data was avail-
able on the extent to which they consumed health professionals' time. We explored the impact
of incorporating DNA costs into total costs in regressions as described for the main analysis,
assigning these visits the same unit costs as successful contacts with participants.
As a consequence of using national reference costs for team contacts to value CMHT and
assertive outreach team inputs, costs calculated may not reflect actual variability in skill-mix
within participating teams; also the costs do not reflect particular team members' duration of
contact with each participant. A concern might be that the method for valuing team contacts
results in the over- or under-estimation of costs. To investigate this important component of
costs’ overall contribution to the ICER, unit costs of assertive outreach and community mental
health team contacts were varied by 25%, 50% and 150%.
Results
Recruitment and sample size
One hundred and forty-one patients were recruited to the trial and randomised at the team
(cluster) level (78 to intervention from 37 teams, 63 to control from 36 teams).[18] In the inter-
vention group, 73% (27/37) of teams were classified as having high MINI scores; in the control
group, the corresponding proportion was 72% (26/36).
Seventy-three teams (141 patients) were randomised and 138 patients participated in the
trial (78 intervention and 60 control). Two patients withdrew from the study after learning of
their allocation to the control group; also, during data extraction from medical records at base-
line, it was discovered that one control participant had not been prescribed depot medication
and was withdrawn from the trial as ineligible. Seven intervention and four control participants
were found on checks against baseline data to have been adherent over the 4-month period
over which they had been screened and were retained in all analyses, as were four patients with
excluded diagnoses (e.g. psychosis disorders other than schizophrenia, and schizo-affective or
bipolar disorder).[18] While complete or partial resource use data were available at baseline for
138 participants and at follow-up (the end of the 12 month study period) for 137 participants,
data sufficient to calculate participants' total costs at both time-points were available for 117.
Data sufficient to calculate the primary outcome at both time points were available for 71 inter-
vention and 52 control participants (72 intervention and 55 control participants at baseline; 75
in intervention and 56 in control at follow-up). Economic and outcome data for both time
points were available for 117 participants.
Characteristics of trial participants at baseline
Characteristics of participants with both costs and outcomes data available were somewhat bal-
anced in terms of sex, living arrangements, ethnicity, employment status and diagnostic cate-
gory (S1 Table). Intervention participants were slightly older (2.6 years) than controls. Within
this sample, 61% of participants lived alone. Almost all participants were unemployed and on
some form of welfare benefit. 40% of participants were from a black or other ethnic minority.
Three-quarters of participants lived in independent accommodation, a fifth lived in supported
Cost Effectiveness: Financial Incentives and Depot Medications
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housing, and a small number had only temporary accommodation or were homeless. Baseline
characteristics of participants for whom complete costs and outcomes data were available and
those of participants for whom any of these data were not available (including those withdraw-
ing/withdrawn from the trial) are presented in S1 Table.
Resource use and costs
The majority of participants were treated by community mental health teams over the study
period (40 control and 54 intervention participants were seen by 26 and 24 teams respectively);
a smaller number were under the care of assertive outreach teams (9 and 13 teams seeing 17
control and 20 intervention participants respectively). There were few notable differences in
resource use between the groups over this time (S2 Table). Intervention participants experi-
enced fewer days in a mental health in-patient bed and more days in a general hospital in-
patient bed than controls, but the differences between groups were not statistically significant
at the 5% level. The intervention group experienced 0.03 fewer mental health admissions per
head than the control group (0.37 (SE 0.1) intervention vs. 0.41 (SE 0.11) control). Admitted
intervention participants had shorter stays on average than controls (27 (SE 7.7) days for 16
participants vs. 30.4 (SE 11.5) for 14 participants), a difference of 3.4 days (95% CI -30.7, 23.8).
Intervention participants had significantly more contacts than controls with community men-
tal health nurses in service settings (5.2 (95% CI 1, 9.5), p = 0.017). This finding appears consis-
tent with the significantly greater number of depot medications received by intervention
participants over the period (20.2 (SE 0.77) intervention vs. 14.9 (SE 0.97) control, a difference
of 5.2 (95% CI 2.8, 7.6), t = -4.28, p = 0.000). DNAs associated with community mental health
nurses in any setting were also fewer in the intervention group (1.9 (SE 0.4) intervention vs. 3.2
(SE 0.52) control, a difference of 1.4 (95% CI -2.6, -0.1), t = 2.102, p = 0.037)) (S3 Table).
Over pre-baseline and study periods, most participants received relatively low-cost medica-
tions, although a substantial minority in both groups received risperidone (S4 Table). The pro-
portions within drug category did not generally differ substantially by group. Somewhat larger
proportions of intervention than control patients received 2-week cycle depots of flupentixol in
both pre-baseline (20% vs 8.7% respectively) and intervention periods (21.2% vs 12.3% respec-
tively). A larger proportion of control than intervention patients received depots on a 4-week
treatment cycle (18/56 (32%) vs. 13/75 (17%) respectively) over the study period.
Community mental health service costs were significantly higher in the intervention than in
the control group (Table 2); however, this appears to be a continuation of an imbalance
between groups in the number of contacts with these services over the pre-baseline period (S5
Table). The median number of financial incentives given over the study period was 21 (mean
20.2 as reported above; interquartile range 8); the average cost of the incentive itself was £303
(SE £12). Total costs of intervention participants, including the cost of providing the financial
incentive, were somewhat higher than those of controls (£9,350 (SE £1,189) vs. £8,8651 (SE
£1,890), a difference of £699 (95% CI -£3 535, £4 932). Community mental health services
made up almost half (48%), hospital costs more than a third (37%) and medication costs 12%,
of the total costs across the follow-up sample where data on all categories were available
(n = 125). The average cost of the incentive itself made up only a small proportion (2%) of total
intervention group costs.
Cost-effectiveness analyses
Data from 60 clusters were analysed (31 intervention and 29 control) (Table A in S2 File). For
the 117 participants with both outcomes and costs available, the difference in unadjusted mean
proportions adherent was 14.2% and the difference in proportions with good adherence was
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23.3% (Table 3). Mean differences in SQOL scores and CGI scores (proportion improved)
were 19.3% and 18.2% respectively.
Comparing the costs of all the cases available at each time point (Table 2) to the costs of the
sample available for analysis (table 3), the control group costs at both time points were some-
what higher than the corresponding values in the intervention group. It is possible that the
adjusted cost difference between groups, if all the cases had sufficient data available at both
time points to calculate costs and outcomes, might have been larger. However, given the stan-
dard errors of the unadjusted costs at both points, there is little evidence that the baseline and
study-period costs of the complete-cases sample were truly different from those in the available
cases.
From the multilevel multivariate regressions (Table 3), there was an adherence difference
of 12.2% (95% CI 4.6%, 19.8%) on the primary trial outcome of proportion of medications
Table 2. Costs over 12 months prior to baseline and over 12-month intervention period, available cases.
Control Intervention Intervention-control
Cost category n = 60 n = 78 Raw mean difference
Baseline Valid N Mean (SE) Valid N Mean (SE) (95% CI)
Total MH hospital costs 60 4 048 (1686) 78 3 342 (1173) - 706 (-4 648, 3 236)
Total general hospital costs 60 252 (219) 78 262 (207) 10 (-592, 611)
Total primary care costs 57 8 (3) 75 47 (36) 39 (-43, 121)
Total community mental health care costs 59 3 644 (375) 78 5 041 (443) 1 397 (201, 2 594)a
Total depot costs 55 861 (174) 72 714 (108) -147 (-535, 241)
Total oral costs 56 313 (129) 76 479 (149) 166 (-242, 574)
Total costsb 54 9274 (1993) 72 8058 (1024) -1 217 (-5 355, 2 921)
Total costs, including cost of DNA contacts 54 10511 (2004) 72 10088 (1059) -423 (-4622, 3777)
12 month follow-up (n = 59) (n = 78)
Total MH hospital costs 59 5 105 (1 787) 78 3 407 (1 101) -1 698 (-5 661, 2 266)
Total general hospital costs 57 27 (13) 76 254 (181) 227 (-188, 642)
Total primary care costs 57 14 (6) 74 48 (43) 34 (-63, 130)
Total community mental health care costs 57 3 859 (426) 74 4 964 (353) 1 105 (17, 2 192)a
Total depot costs 56 759 (188) 75 787 (132) 28 (-413, 470)
Total oral costs 57 216 (68) 76 364 (76) 149 (-61, 358)
Total costs including ﬁnancial incentive costsb 54 8 651 (1 890) 71 9 350 (1 189) 699 (-3 535, 4 932)
FI intervention costs 56 0 75 303 (12) 303 (277, 329)c
Total costs excl. ﬁnancial incentive costs 54 8651 (1 890) 71 9 043 (1 189) 392 (-3 842, 4 625)
Total costs excl. oral medications, ﬁnancial incentives 54 8476 (1855) 71 8 721 (1 191) 245 (-3 944, 4 433)
Total costs excl. medications and ﬁnancial incentives 57 9 050 (2 030) 74 8 680 (1 324) -370 (-4 987, 4 248)
Sensitivity analyses
Total including DNA contact costs 54 9 610 (1 881) 71 10 162 (1 221) 552 (-3715, 4819)
Total, varying unit cost of CMHT or AOT contacts:
At 25% 54 6 118 (1 769) 71 5 991 (1 098) -127 (-4 069, 3 814)
At 50% 54 7 282 (1 801) 71 7 381 (1 131) 99 (-3 931, 4 129)
At 150% 54 11 938 (1 982) 71 12 943 (1 337) 1 005 (-3 567, 5 576)
CMHT = community mental health team, AOT = assertive outreach team.
a p<0.05 on t-test.
b costs of participants for whom both community mental health service data and depot medication data were available.
c p<0.001 on t-test,
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0138816.t002
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Table 3. Cost-effectiveness analyses: costs and outcomes, complete cases sample (n = 117).
Control (SE)
(n = 49)
Intervention (SE)
(n = 68)
Difference (95% CI) or
ICERa
Costs prior to baseline
(raw)
9 755 (2 184) 7 780 (976) -1974 (-6 292, 2 344)
Costs over study period
(raw)
9 309 (2 061) 9 212 (1 234) -97 (-4 600, 4 406)
Continuous adherence
outcome
Proportion adherent (raw) 71.6 (21.7) 85.8 (14.3) 14.2 (7.6, 20.8)b
Proportion adherent (adjusted) 73.4 (3) 85.6 (2.9) 12.2 (4.6, 19.8)c
Costs over study period (adjusted) 9 083 (1 931) 9 681 (1 740) 598 (-4 533, 5 730)
ICER (20% increase adherence) 982 (-8 020, 14 000)d
Binary adherence outcome Adherence GTE 95% (raw) 6.1 (24.2) 29.4 (45.9) 23.3 (9, 37.5)c
Proportion adherent (adjusted) 4.9 (10.9) 31.3 (10.3) 26.5 (11.7, 41.2)b
Costs over study period (adjusted) 8 944 (1 954) 9 724 (1 766) 780 (-4 419, 5 979)
ICER (achievement 'good' adherence) 2 950 (-19 400, 27
800)d
Sensitivity
Including costs of DNAs Costs over study period (raw) 10 410 (2 052) 10 290 (1 288) -120 (-4 694, 4 454)
Proportion adherent (adjusted) 73.4 (2.9) 85.6 (2.9) 12.2 (4.7,19.8)c
Costs over study period (adjusted) 10 054 (1 949) 10 486 (1 755) 432 (-4 747,5 611)
ICER (20% increase adherence) 706 (-8 300, 13 540)
Unit costs: at 25% of
estimate
Costs over study period (raw) 6 830 (1 935) 6 271 (1 169) -559 (-4 803, 3 686)
Proportion adherent (adjusted) 73.3 (3.0) 85.7 (2.9) 12.4 (4.8, 20)c
Costs over study period (adjusted) 6 390 (1 772) 6 480 (1 577) 90 (-4 593, 4 774)
ICER (20% increase adherence) 146 (-7 920, 11 160)
Unit costs: at 50% of
estimate
Costs over study period (raw) 8 023 (1 968) 7 611 (1 202) -412 (-4 748, 3 923)
Proportion adherent (adjusted) 73.3 (2.9) 85.7 (2.8) 12.3 (4.8,19.9)c
Costs over study period (adjusted) 7 369 (1 833) 7 663 (1 635) 294 (-4 555, 5 144)
ICER (20% increase adherence) 476 (-7 900, 12 120)
Unit costs: at 150% of
estimate
Costs over study period (raw) 12 797 (2 158) 12 970 (1 398) 172 (-4 705, 5 050)
Proportion adherent (adjusted) 73.5 (3) 85.6 (2.9) 12.1 (4.5, 19.7)c
Costs over study period (adjusted) 11 325 (2 075) 12 397 (1 874) 1 072 (-4 448, 6 592)
ICER (20% increase adherence) 1 770 (-7 880, 16 380)
Secondary outcomes
Control (SE)
(n = 41)
Intervention (SE)
(n = 55)
Difference (95% CI)
Clinical Global Impression
(binary)
Proportion improved (raw) 40 (49.6) 58.2 (49.8) 18.2 (-2.3, 38.7)
Proportion improved (adjusted) 43 (9.7) 55.5 (9.1) 12.5 (-12.3, 37.3)
Costs over study period (adjusted) 10 238 (2 053) 8 905 (1 796) -1 333 (-6 726, 4 061)
Control (SE) Intervention (SE) Difference (95% CI)
Subjective Quality of Life
(SQOL)
SQOL score (raw) (control n = 30; intervention
n = 54)
4.99 (0.96) 5.18 (0.75) 0.193 (-0.18, 0.57)
SQOL score (adjusted) (control n = 20; intervention
n = 37)
4.764 (2.587) 5.462 (2.56) 0.698 (0.239, 1.157)c
(Continued)
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adhered to. The proportion of participants achieving good adherence over the treatment period
was 26.5% (95% CI 11.7%, 41.2%) higher in the intervention group than in the controls. The
adjusted cost difference between groups was £598 (95% CI -£4 533, £5 730) on the continuous
adherence outcome and £780 (95% CI -£4 419, £5 979) on the binary adherence outcome.
The ICER, or incremental cost for an increase in adherence to depot medications of 20%,
was £982 (95% CI -£8 020, £14 000), and the probability that the incentive treatment was cost-
effective on this measure (Fig 1) exceeded 97.5% at willingness to pay values over £14 000 (the
upper confidence limit for the ICER).[35] The incremental cost of achieving good adherence
was £2 950 and the probability of cost-effectiveness (Fig 2) was over 97.5% at willingness to pay
values for this outcome over £27 800.
Sensitivity analyses. The adjusted difference in total costs, if including DNA contact costs,
was slightly lower than in the base case, at £432 (£10 054 control vs. £10 486 intervention)
(Table 3). The cost of achieving a 20% increase in adherence was £706 (95% CI -£8 300, £13
540); the probability that the incentive treatment was cost-effective in terms of achieving a 20%
increase in adherence exceeded 97.5% at a willingness to pay of £13 600.
Exploring the effect of varying the unit costs of team contacts, adjusted cost differences ran-
ged from £90 (95% CI -£4 593, £4 774) if unit costs were 25% of those used in the base case to
£1 072 (95% CI -£4 448, £6 592) if unit costs were increased by 150%. While adjusted total cost
differences varied widely between the lowest and highest of these alternatives, confidence inter-
vals were wide in all cases. ICERs for variations in unit costs of 25% and 150% were £146 (95%
CI -£7 920, £11 160) and £1 770 (95% CI -£7 880, £16 380) respectively. ICERs were fairly
insensitive to unit costs used, given that confidence intervals of all point estimates generated in
this sensitivity analysis overlap substantially.
Clinical outcomes. We examined two other outcomes: SQOL scores and clinical improve-
ment measured by dichotomising CGI scores into improved and no change/worse. The pro-
portion of missing data was high in both the CGI (19%; 18% of the control and 19% of the
intervention group) and the SQOL (28%). In the latter case, considerably more data were miss-
ing from the control (39%) than from the intervention group (21%). Adjusted costs and out-
comes from the multilevel regressions are given in Table 3; given the extent of missingness for
both measures, ICERs have not been calculated. SQOL scores were slightly higher (higher satis-
faction) in the intervention group (a difference of 0.698, p = 0.003); the proportion improved
according to the dichotomised CGI was 12.5% higher in the intervention group (p = 0.320).
Discussion
This study provides new evidence on the outcomes, costs and cost-effectiveness of offering a
modest financial incentive to people on antipsychotic medication to remain adherent. Adjust-
ing for area-level deprivation, average treatment cycle length, and pre-baseline period costs
and adherence, costs were somewhat higher in the intervention group. However, the
Table 3. (Continued)
Costs over study period (adjusted) (control n = 20;
intervention n = 37)
9 902 (2 990) 7 824 (2 266) -2 078 (-9 553, 5 397)
ICER = incremental cost-effectiveness ratio; DNA = did not attend sessions with health professionals.
a ICER rounded to nearest 10.
b p<0.001.
c p<0.01.
d The negative lower limit of the ICER conﬁdence interval indicates dominance (the intervention is less costly and more effective).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0138816.t003
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confidence interval of the difference in costs between groups was wide. The incremental cost of
achieving a 20% increase in adherence was estimated to be £982. The financial incentive can be
considered cost-effective in achieving this outcome with a very high level of confidence if the
purchaser is willing to pay approximately £14 000. The incentive may have increased atten-
dance at appointments with community mental health nurses. There is little evidence that the
incentive decreased the costs of psychiatric or general secondary care; however, as the study
was not powered to detect differences in hospital utilisation this result should be interpreted
with caution. The results of the cluster-randomised trial suggest that the groups did not differ
on broader societal outcomes such as police arrests or on take-up of training courses.[18]
Previous studies suggest a relationship between adherence and desirable outcomes such as
decreased risk of hospitalisation, [9] relapse [36] and more engagement with outpatient psychi-
atric treatment, [37] but do not indicate how much purchasers are willing to pay for adherence
and what purchasers might hope to expect from improved adherence. Analysis of data from a
trial examining the effectiveness of adherence therapy for people with schizophrenia found
that non-adherence was not significantly associated with costs of health and social care, nor
with use of inpatient hospital services.[38, 39] The link between improved adherence and better
outcomes (as opposed to non-adherence and negative outcomes) is not necessarily straightfor-
ward—for instance Staring et al.[40] found that improved adherence using a self-report
measure did not increase subjective QOL or decrease psychiatric symptoms or hospital
Fig 1. Cost-effectiveness acceptability curve: proportion adherent over the intervention period.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0138816.g001
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readmissions over a period of 6 months. Decision-makers will want to consider whether they
are satisfied with the evidence that improving adherence improves other outcomes of interest
to them. It should also be acknowledged that public attitudes do not appear to favour the use of
financial incentives to improve health behaviours [41]. Likewise, in the face of evidence that
supports the use of financial incentives to improve medication adherence in a population with
psychotic disorders, the approach remains controversial and clinicians may be reluctant to
adopt this strategy [42–44].
Limitations
The outcome data on clinical improvement and quality of life examined here were not very
complete—due to non-completion by health professionals (CGI) or by participants (SQOL).
The data collection method was designed to minimise the burden on trial participants imposed
by completing questionnaires; such obligations could have deterred 'hard-to-reach' patients
with poor adherence from agreeing to participate, posing a risk of selection bias. This collection
method also minimised time burden on participating teams imposed by providing informa-
tion, and enabled the collection of consistent information from a variety of teams across
England. That considerable proportions of SQOL and CGI data were missing provides support
for the decision to extract data from records, as administering resource use questionnaires
to either professionals or participants could have led to similar problems of missing data.
Fig 2. Cost-effectiveness acceptability curve: proportion achieving good adherence over the intervention period.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0138816.g002
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Objective measurement of adherence based on patient records was a strength of the study
design; few observations were lost due to missing data on medications and depot dates. Never-
theless, cases were lost when insufficient data were available to calculate either cost or out-
comes at both assessment points. In carrying out the cost-effectiveness modelling, we assumed
that the information missing at follow-up was not different from that observed. The multilevel
model employed did adjust for baseline costs/outcomes and deprivation covariates and thus
for imbalances that could be related to reasons for loss to follow-up.
The design also limited collection activities to extracting information on NHS service use
from participating organisations’ patient records. Records of use of services outside NHS
Trusts’ own organisations may vary considerably depending on local information-sharing pol-
icy and practice. The extent to which records accurately reflected patients' use of primary care
trusts' services is unknown.
We used a national reference cost per contact with mental health team members. Costs did
not reflect inter-team variability in duration of contacts, as these data were mostly not available
in the records. Consequently, any relationship between contact duration and adherence to
depot medication was not reflected in our cost estimates. However using a single unit cost for
all members of assertive outreach or community mental health team staff, while not reflecting
actual local variations in skill mix in the total costs, may be more generalizable to the national
context and reflect the potential variety of skill-mix in these teams across the country.
The results of this study raise further questions about the longer-term outcomes for patients
in receipt of financial incentives. The next two phases of the study will provide an opportunity
to track participants over a further two years after the end of the intervention period to exam-
ine outcomes and also to investigate the relationship between treatment cycles, receipt of
incentive payments and adherence. It could be asked whether a larger monetary incentive than
£15 per injection might have had a greater impact on medication adherence (a recent meta-
analysis of study data drawn largely from fields other than mental health [43] found that inter-
ventions with monetary reinforcements over US $50 had greater efficacy than lower amounts).
Or, it could equally be argued, these were substantial payments for patients, given that virtually
all were in receipt of welfare benefits. Should financial incentives become routinely available,
future research could usefully investigate whether adherent patients with psychosis are incenti-
vised to become non-adherent in order to benefit from this policy. Such concerns have been
raised in previous research with clinicians and patients [42]. These situations did arise, accord-
ing to clinicians in some teams implementing the intervention, but were characterised as short-
lived and amenable to swift resolution in the context of a research trial.[45].
While some teams involved in the trial reported the occurrence of these issues, they also
described these situations as being resolved quickly in the context of a research trial [45]. Cur-
rently there is little empirical evidence to suggest that financial incentives “crowd out”, or
undermine, intrinsic motivation for health-related behaviours [46]. We note that a new study
in the Netherlands [47], examining ‘money for medication’ in patients with psychosis, pro-
poses to address this question by explicitly measuring participants’ intrinsic motivation before
and after the intervention. Another avenue for future research could be to examine whether
patients with a first episode of psychosis are likely to benefit from financial incentives.
In summary, a financial incentive to improve adherence to antipsychotic depot medication
had a high probability of cost-effectiveness (exceeding 97.5%), judged on either achieving a
20% increase in adherence or of achieving good adherence, at values of willingness to pay in
the region of £14 000 and £27 800 respectively. Decision-makers may also wish to consider
that direct healthcare costs (including costs of the financial incentive) are unlikely to be
increased by offering a modest financial incentive.
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